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Thursday, September 3, 2009
Tuesday, September 1, 2009
Sunday, August 30, 2009
Thacker & Galloway on Protocol
Taken from their article, Networks, Control and Life-Forms:
PROTOCOLS
The principle of political control we suggest is most helpful
for thinking about biological and informatic networks is
"protocol," a word derived from computer science butwhich resonates in the life sciences as well. Protocol
abounds in techno-culture. It is a totalizing control
apparatus that guides both the technical and political
formation of computer networks, biological systems and
other media. Put simply, protocols are all the conventional
rules and standards that govern relationships within
networks. Quite often these relationships come in the form
of communication between two or more computers, but
"relationships within networks" can also refer to purely
biological processes as in the systemic phenomenon of gene
expression. Thus by "networks" we want to refer to any
system of interrelationality, whether biological or
informatic, organic or inorganic, technical or natural--with
the ultimate goal of undoing the polar restrictiveness of
these pairings.
In computer networks, science professionals have, over the
years, drafted hundreds of protocols to govern email, web
pages, and so on, plus many other standards for
technologies rarely seen by human eyes. The first protocols
for computer networks were written in 1969 by Steve
Crocker and others. If networks are the structures that
connect people, then protocols are the rules that make sure
the connections actually work. From the large technological
discourse of white papers, memos, and manuals, we can
derive some of the basic qualities of the apparatus of
organization which we here call protocol:
· protocol facilitates relationships between
interconnected, but autonomous, entities;
· protocol's virtues include robustness, contingency,
interoperability, flexibility, and heterogeneity;
· a goal of protocol is to accommodate everything, no
matter what source or destination, no matter what
originary definition or identity;
· while protocol is universal, it is always achieved
through negotiation (meaning that in the future
protocol can and will be different);
· protocol is a system for maintaining organization
and control in networks.
In many current political discussions, networks are seen as
the new paradigm of social and political organization. The
reason is that networks exhibit a set of properties that
distinguishes them from more centralized power structures.
These properties are often taken to be merely abstract,
formal aspects of the network--which is itself characterized
as a kind of meta-structure. We see this in "pop science"
books discussing complexity and network science, as well
as in the political discourse of "netwars" and so forth. What
we end up with is a metaphysics of networks. The network,
then, appears as a universal signifier of political resistance,
be it in Chiapas, Seattle, Geneva, or online. What we
question is not the network concept itself, for, as a number
of network examples show, they can indeed be effective
modes of political struggle. What we do question is the
undue and exclusive reliance on the metaphysics of the
network, as if this ahistorical concept legitimizes itself
merely by existing.
PROTOCOLS
The principle of political control we suggest is most helpful
for thinking about biological and informatic networks is
"protocol," a word derived from computer science butwhich resonates in the life sciences as well. Protocol
abounds in techno-culture. It is a totalizing control
apparatus that guides both the technical and political
formation of computer networks, biological systems and
other media. Put simply, protocols are all the conventional
rules and standards that govern relationships within
networks. Quite often these relationships come in the form
of communication between two or more computers, but
"relationships within networks" can also refer to purely
biological processes as in the systemic phenomenon of gene
expression. Thus by "networks" we want to refer to any
system of interrelationality, whether biological or
informatic, organic or inorganic, technical or natural--with
the ultimate goal of undoing the polar restrictiveness of
these pairings.
In computer networks, science professionals have, over the
years, drafted hundreds of protocols to govern email, web
pages, and so on, plus many other standards for
technologies rarely seen by human eyes. The first protocols
for computer networks were written in 1969 by Steve
Crocker and others. If networks are the structures that
connect people, then protocols are the rules that make sure
the connections actually work. From the large technological
discourse of white papers, memos, and manuals, we can
derive some of the basic qualities of the apparatus of
organization which we here call protocol:
· protocol facilitates relationships between
interconnected, but autonomous, entities;
· protocol's virtues include robustness, contingency,
interoperability, flexibility, and heterogeneity;
· a goal of protocol is to accommodate everything, no
matter what source or destination, no matter what
originary definition or identity;
· while protocol is universal, it is always achieved
through negotiation (meaning that in the future
protocol can and will be different);
· protocol is a system for maintaining organization
and control in networks.
In many current political discussions, networks are seen as
the new paradigm of social and political organization. The
reason is that networks exhibit a set of properties that
distinguishes them from more centralized power structures.
These properties are often taken to be merely abstract,
formal aspects of the network--which is itself characterized
as a kind of meta-structure. We see this in "pop science"
books discussing complexity and network science, as well
as in the political discourse of "netwars" and so forth. What
we end up with is a metaphysics of networks. The network,
then, appears as a universal signifier of political resistance,
be it in Chiapas, Seattle, Geneva, or online. What we
question is not the network concept itself, for, as a number
of network examples show, they can indeed be effective
modes of political struggle. What we do question is the
undue and exclusive reliance on the metaphysics of the
network, as if this ahistorical concept legitimizes itself
merely by existing.
5371 Durack Reading Notes
Durack, Katherine T.
Gender, Technology, and the History of Technical Communication
35
publication as ideational performance
36
definition tells us what tc is
1. close relationship to technology
2. associated w/work & workplace--not gender neutral terms tho oft represented as such
37
emphasis often on agency or products: both have need to establish signficance
two assumptions need challenged:
1. women not significant originators of tech/sci/med docs
2. women's tools not sufficient/important enough to study
multiple references to Stanley's work & the obfuscation/cooption of women's work
38
history often ignores technology of daily life
39
industrialization split home from work--recentered heart of production
women often accepted as users of machines but not the repairers of machines
40
focus on workplace writing--one geographic place over another--disempowering to an entire collection of sites where writing takes place
41
many contributions made outside of workplace
Definition revision
1. TW exists in gov't & industry as well as intersection between private/public spheres
2. TW has a close relationship to technology (knolwedge, actions, tools)
3. TW seeks to make tacit knowledge explicit
Gender, Technology, and the History of Technical Communication
35
publication as ideational performance
36
definition tells us what tc is
1. close relationship to technology
2. associated w/work & workplace--not gender neutral terms tho oft represented as such
37
emphasis often on agency or products: both have need to establish signficance
two assumptions need challenged:
1. women not significant originators of tech/sci/med docs
2. women's tools not sufficient/important enough to study
multiple references to Stanley's work & the obfuscation/cooption of women's work
38
history often ignores technology of daily life
39
industrialization split home from work--recentered heart of production
women often accepted as users of machines but not the repairers of machines
40
focus on workplace writing--one geographic place over another--disempowering to an entire collection of sites where writing takes place
41
many contributions made outside of workplace
Definition revision
1. TW exists in gov't & industry as well as intersection between private/public spheres
2. TW has a close relationship to technology (knolwedge, actions, tools)
3. TW seeks to make tacit knowledge explicit
5369/ Jonas/ Ch 18 Reading Response
Gregory Zobel
Chapter 18
Hans Jonas: Toward a Philosophy of Technology
Hans Jonas works towards defining terms and identifying key themes surrounding the philosophy of technology. Jonas identifies two other major themes in the philosophy of technology: form and matter. Jonas labels them formal dynamics and substantive content. Formal dynamics represents technology as a "continuing collective enterprise" which is apparently self-propelled; substantive content of technology is "[T]he things it puts into human use, the powers it confers, the novel objectives it opens up or dictates, and the altered manner of human action by which these objectives are realized" (191). As Jonas states, the first is abstract and the second is concrete. To this he adds the third theme of morals or ethics.
Jonas spends five pages developing the formal dynamics of technology. The first key points he establishes is that while earlier technology was centered around possession of tools, modern technology is focused on being a process (192). A key aspects of this process is the notion of constant progress (192-3). Other traits Jonas identifies technology as having spur the feedbackish ideological loop of infinite progress: restlessness; competition; population growth; quasi-utopian visions; need for social control; and the premise that eternal progress is possible (193-4). This last element, Jonas states, is key: "Unless we understand this ontologic-epistemological premise, we have not understood the inmost agent of technological dynamics" (194). Jonas then goes on to identify how science and technology feed each other's restlessness, motivate each other, and urge each other forward to perpetual research and development (195).
Next Jonas explores the materiality of technology and several facets of its expression. First, technology exerts demands on the social and natural worlds. However, technology often generates other technology with even greater demands; he cites the steam engine's need for coal as an example (197). This new technology, often designed for production of goods, regularly shifts into the private homes and lives of people, such as audio and visual production (198). Another result of technological development is that entirely new things are discovered, like electricity, or media are created, such as communication engineering. Thus, while science may generate knowledge that technology can use, technology generates tools that facilitates scientific discovery of yet more things which technology can then apply. The final frontier of this discovery/application, Jonas asserts, is biology and the human body.
Finally, Jonas explores the ethics of technology. As he states, given the overwhelming power and impact of technology on life, the future of human life is at stake, so ethics are going to be involved (200). He claims that even though technology appears to offer people a greater sense of freedom, technology simultaneously creates a greater state of determinism. The very artifact that we have now implies that there is something better, something as yet undiscovered, and since we hold one object today, that very object drives us to desire and create something for tomorrow (201). Rather than simply participating in this process, Jonas pushes for an awareness of the process and an awareness of the dangers of certain technologies and technological systems (201-2). For Jonas, the real issue in maintaining proper balance and control of technology is to make sure that the proper people into positions of responsibility and power (202).
Chapter 18
Hans Jonas: Toward a Philosophy of Technology
Hans Jonas works towards defining terms and identifying key themes surrounding the philosophy of technology. Jonas identifies two other major themes in the philosophy of technology: form and matter. Jonas labels them formal dynamics and substantive content. Formal dynamics represents technology as a "continuing collective enterprise" which is apparently self-propelled; substantive content of technology is "[T]he things it puts into human use, the powers it confers, the novel objectives it opens up or dictates, and the altered manner of human action by which these objectives are realized" (191). As Jonas states, the first is abstract and the second is concrete. To this he adds the third theme of morals or ethics.
Jonas spends five pages developing the formal dynamics of technology. The first key points he establishes is that while earlier technology was centered around possession of tools, modern technology is focused on being a process (192). A key aspects of this process is the notion of constant progress (192-3). Other traits Jonas identifies technology as having spur the feedbackish ideological loop of infinite progress: restlessness; competition; population growth; quasi-utopian visions; need for social control; and the premise that eternal progress is possible (193-4). This last element, Jonas states, is key: "Unless we understand this ontologic-epistemological premise, we have not understood the inmost agent of technological dynamics" (194). Jonas then goes on to identify how science and technology feed each other's restlessness, motivate each other, and urge each other forward to perpetual research and development (195).
Next Jonas explores the materiality of technology and several facets of its expression. First, technology exerts demands on the social and natural worlds. However, technology often generates other technology with even greater demands; he cites the steam engine's need for coal as an example (197). This new technology, often designed for production of goods, regularly shifts into the private homes and lives of people, such as audio and visual production (198). Another result of technological development is that entirely new things are discovered, like electricity, or media are created, such as communication engineering. Thus, while science may generate knowledge that technology can use, technology generates tools that facilitates scientific discovery of yet more things which technology can then apply. The final frontier of this discovery/application, Jonas asserts, is biology and the human body.
Finally, Jonas explores the ethics of technology. As he states, given the overwhelming power and impact of technology on life, the future of human life is at stake, so ethics are going to be involved (200). He claims that even though technology appears to offer people a greater sense of freedom, technology simultaneously creates a greater state of determinism. The very artifact that we have now implies that there is something better, something as yet undiscovered, and since we hold one object today, that very object drives us to desire and create something for tomorrow (201). Rather than simply participating in this process, Jonas pushes for an awareness of the process and an awareness of the dangers of certain technologies and technological systems (201-2). For Jonas, the real issue in maintaining proper balance and control of technology is to make sure that the proper people into positions of responsibility and power (202).
5369/ Shrader-Frechette/ Ch 17 Reading Response
Gregory Zobel
Chapter 17
Kristin Shrader-Frechette: Technology and Ethics
Shrader-Frechette argues that the development of technology has not generated new ethical questions; rather, technology has expanded on currently existing ethical questions. She then asserts that new technological developments requires critics who examine ethics and technology need both technological and philosophical skills (187). One reason is that "Although such factual knowledge does not determine the ethical decision, it constrains it in important and unavoidable way" (187). Shrader-Frechette also asserts that knowledge of economics is equally critical.
Next, she describes the five key categories for most technology and ethics questions:
1. conceptual/metaethical
2. general normative
3. particular normative
4. ethical consequences of technological developments
5. ethical justifiability of methods of assessing technology (187).
Central to the discussion of technology and ethics is the concept of risk. Shrader-Frechette asserts that technical experts and engineers define risk in probabilistic terms regarding fatality and use quantitative language. Humanistic critics, she claims, state that such terms are not a full accounting of the risk and do not address issues of democracy, consent, welfare, and personal freedom (188). Even when risks are analyzed and put forth, decision making is still conflicted. Two strong, opposing trends are to select the technology which offers the greatest benefit or to select the technology which offers the least catastrophic risk.
The notion of risk is complicated even more, Shrader-Frechette asserts, by technologies like fission which, if catastrophes do happen, can impact large portions of the population who did not consent to be in the range of the experiment or its benefits. This issue summons another topic: consent. One side argues that if a person takes a job, or a culture wants the benefits of a certain technology, then they have consented to the inherent risks. Opposition states that acceptance does not mean consent to certain risks, especially if those risks are not clearly and thoroughly understood.
Chapter 17
Kristin Shrader-Frechette: Technology and Ethics
Shrader-Frechette argues that the development of technology has not generated new ethical questions; rather, technology has expanded on currently existing ethical questions. She then asserts that new technological developments requires critics who examine ethics and technology need both technological and philosophical skills (187). One reason is that "Although such factual knowledge does not determine the ethical decision, it constrains it in important and unavoidable way" (187). Shrader-Frechette also asserts that knowledge of economics is equally critical.
Next, she describes the five key categories for most technology and ethics questions:
1. conceptual/metaethical
2. general normative
3. particular normative
4. ethical consequences of technological developments
5. ethical justifiability of methods of assessing technology (187).
Central to the discussion of technology and ethics is the concept of risk. Shrader-Frechette asserts that technical experts and engineers define risk in probabilistic terms regarding fatality and use quantitative language. Humanistic critics, she claims, state that such terms are not a full accounting of the risk and do not address issues of democracy, consent, welfare, and personal freedom (188). Even when risks are analyzed and put forth, decision making is still conflicted. Two strong, opposing trends are to select the technology which offers the greatest benefit or to select the technology which offers the least catastrophic risk.
The notion of risk is complicated even more, Shrader-Frechette asserts, by technologies like fission which, if catastrophes do happen, can impact large portions of the population who did not consent to be in the range of the experiment or its benefits. This issue summons another topic: consent. One side argues that if a person takes a job, or a culture wants the benefits of a certain technology, then they have consented to the inherent risks. Opposition states that acceptance does not mean consent to certain risks, especially if those risks are not clearly and thoroughly understood.
5369/ Ellul/ Ch 16 Reading Response
Gregory Zobel
Chapter 16
Jacques Ellul: On the Aims of a Philosophy of Technology
The Ellul excerpt centers on contextualizing the setting for his argument and defining key ideas. He begins strategically by claiming that no total account of technology, or what he calls technique, is possible. Ellul defines technique thus: "[T]echnique is the totality of methods rationally arrived at and having absolute efficiency (for a given stage of development) in every field of human activity" (182). Shortly thereafter, Ellul acknowledges that he, too, is involved in a technological civilization, and thus his perspective is biased (183). Then he claims that he has not set out to prove anything (183). Ellul continues hedging his position and states that his work centers on collective, not individual, mechanisms. The only role of the historical past is for comparison. Once he completes his hedging, he warns the reader not to be fatalistic; his conclusions are only probable if the populations do not respond and change their current course.
Ellul offers no solution, and he claims that no solution offered as yet to the challenge of technique is viable. Earlier solutions he dismisses as fanciful or simplistic. These will not work because, "Technique presents man with multiple problems" (185). The problems are complex and require complex solutions. Ironically, the individual man whose life Ellul cannot account for is then held accountable and, according to Ellul, is the potential source of the solution: "Each man must make this effort [to overcome technological determinants] in every area of life, in his profession and in his social, religious, and family relationships" (185). Resisting technological determination not only helps humanity avoid the oncoming problems Ellul will describe in his book, but is also an expression of personal freedom for Ellul defines freedom as not inherent; rather, "[F]reedom consists in overcoming and transcending these determinisms" (185). Thus, the solution Ellul provides appears to be one of individually designed resistance to technological determinism.
Chapter 16
Jacques Ellul: On the Aims of a Philosophy of Technology
The Ellul excerpt centers on contextualizing the setting for his argument and defining key ideas. He begins strategically by claiming that no total account of technology, or what he calls technique, is possible. Ellul defines technique thus: "[T]echnique is the totality of methods rationally arrived at and having absolute efficiency (for a given stage of development) in every field of human activity" (182). Shortly thereafter, Ellul acknowledges that he, too, is involved in a technological civilization, and thus his perspective is biased (183). Then he claims that he has not set out to prove anything (183). Ellul continues hedging his position and states that his work centers on collective, not individual, mechanisms. The only role of the historical past is for comparison. Once he completes his hedging, he warns the reader not to be fatalistic; his conclusions are only probable if the populations do not respond and change their current course.
Ellul offers no solution, and he claims that no solution offered as yet to the challenge of technique is viable. Earlier solutions he dismisses as fanciful or simplistic. These will not work because, "Technique presents man with multiple problems" (185). The problems are complex and require complex solutions. Ironically, the individual man whose life Ellul cannot account for is then held accountable and, according to Ellul, is the potential source of the solution: "Each man must make this effort [to overcome technological determinants] in every area of life, in his profession and in his social, religious, and family relationships" (185). Resisting technological determination not only helps humanity avoid the oncoming problems Ellul will describe in his book, but is also an expression of personal freedom for Ellul defines freedom as not inherent; rather, "[F]reedom consists in overcoming and transcending these determinisms" (185). Thus, the solution Ellul provides appears to be one of individually designed resistance to technological determinism.
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