Eco: The Wolf & The Lamb

Eco, Umberto. "The Wolf and the Lamb: The Rhetoric of Oppression." Turning Back the Clock: Hot Wars and Media Populism. Harcourt, 2006. Orlando.

This is a great essay by Eco on rhetoric and oppression.

45-46 aristotle and some definitions of rhetoric

Lots of discussion about begging the question, how oppressors structure arguments/persuasion to manipulate folks, etc.

A nice linking between classical rhetoric and contemporary issues in the gulf with some WW I and WW II references to help set the tone. As always, it is written beautifully.

Aristotle: Rhetoric: Book 2: Ch 10-

Ch 10-11

Difference between envy and emulation is that envy is being upset that someone has something you do not; emulation is being upset that you do not have something that someone else does. Envy is doing things to prevent your neighbor from living well; emulation is doing things so that you live well.

Ch 16

There is indeed one difference between the type of the newly-enriched and those who have long been rich: the newly-enriched have all the bad qualities mentioned in an exaggerated and worse form -- to be newly-enriched means, so to speak, no education in riches.

It was interesting to learn that hatred of the nouveau riche has been around for millenia.

Ch 21: Rocking the Maxim
1395b

The maxim, as has been already said, a general statement and people love to hear stated in general terms what they already believe in some particular connexion: e.g. if a man happens to have bad neighbours or bad children, he will agree with any one who tells him, "Nothing is more annoying than having neighbours," or, "Nothing is more foolish than to be the parent of children." The orator has therefore to guess the subjects on which his hearers really hold views already, and what those views are, and then must express, as general truths, these same views on these same subjects. This is one advantage of using maxims. There is another which is more important -- it invests a speech with moral character. There is moral character in every speech in which the moral purpose is conspicuous: and maxims always produce this effect, because the utterance of them amounts to a general declaration of moral principles: so that, if the maxims are sound, they display the speaker as a man of sound moral character.

Read through chapter 23
Reread 23. It's dense.

Aristotle: Rhetoric: Book 2: notes

Chapter 1
1378 a

There are three things which inspire confidence in the orator's own character -- the three, namely, that induce us to believe a thing apart from any proof of it: good sense, good moral character, and goodwill. False statements and bad advice are due to one or more of the following three causes. Men either form a false opinion through want of good sense; or they form a true opinion, but because of their moral badness do not say what they really think; or finally, they are both sensible and upright, but not well disposed to their hearers, and may fail in consequence to recommend what they know to be the best course.

Chapter 3

The reason is that it is shameless to deny what is obvious, and those who are shameless towards us slight us and show contempt for us: anyhow, we do not feel shame before those of whom we are thoroughly contemptuous.

At the end of Ch. 3

It is now plain that when you wish to calm others you must draw upon these lines of argument; you must put your hearers into the corresponding frame of mind, and represent those with whom they are angry as formidable, or as worthy of reverence, or as benefactors, or as involuntary agents, or as much distressed at what they have done.

Chapter 4

We may describe friendly feeling towards any one as wishing for him what you believe to be good things, not for your own sake but for his, [1381a] and being inclined, so far as you can, to bring these things about. A friend is one who feels thus and excites these feelings in return: those who think they feel thus towards each other think themselves friends. This being assumed, it follows that your friend is the sort of man who shares your pleasure in what is good and your pain in what is unpleasant, for your sake and for no other reason.

Things that cause friendship are: doing kindnesses; doing them unasked; and not proclaiming the fact when they are done, which shows that they were done for our own sake and not for some other reason.

Chapter 5

Fear may be defined as a pain or disturbance due to a mental picture of some destructive or painful evil in the future.

... we can also see what Confidence is, about what things we feel it, and under what conditions. It is the opposite of fear, and what causes it is the opposite of what causes fear; it is, therefore, the expectation associated with a mental picture of the nearness of what keeps us safe and the absence or remoteness of what is terrible: it may be due either to the near presence of what inspires confidence or to the absence of what causes alarm. We feel it if we can take steps -- many, or important, or both -- to cure or prevent trouble; if we have neither wronged others nor been wronged by them; if we have either no rivals at all or no strong ones; if our rivals who are strong are our friends or have treated us well or been treated well by us; or if those whose interest is the same as ours are the more numerous party, or the stronger, or both.

Chapter 7
1385b

In considering this subject we must look at all the "categories": an act may be an act of kindness because (1) it is a particular thing, (2) it has a particular magnitude or (3) quality, or (4) is done at a particular time or (5) place. As evidence of the want of kindness, we may point out that a smaller service had been refused to the man in need; or that the same service, or an equal or greater one, has been given to his enemies; these facts show that the service in question was not done for the sake of the person helped. Or we may point out that the thing desired was worthless and that the helper knew it: no one will admit that he is in need of what is worthless.

Aristotle Rhetoric Notes

Book 1, Chapter 11

On Learning:

Learning things and wondering at things are also pleasant as a rule; wondering implies the desire of learning, so that the object of wonder is an object of desire; while in learning one is brought into one's natural condition.

That last phrase just needs to be thought about. A lot.


Practical Wisdom:

And since power over others is very pleasant, it is pleasant to be thought wise, for practical wisdom secures us power over others.

Could TC be seen as practical wisdom/ applied knowledge? Does that make it "power over others?"

Combative Sports in Aristotle

Rhetoric: Book I: Chapter 11

Victory also is pleasant, and not merely to "bad losers," but to every one; the winner sees himself in the light of a champion, and everybody has a more or less keen appetite for being that. The pleasantness of victory implies of course that combative sports and intellectual contests are pleasant [1371a] (since in these it often happens that some one wins) and also games like knuckle-bones, ball, dice, and draughts. And similarly with the serious sports; some of these become pleasant when one is accustomed to them; while others are pleasant from the first, like hunting with hounds, or indeed any kind of hunting. For where there is competition, there is victory. That is why forensic pleading and debating contests are pleasant to those who are accustomed to them and have the capacity for them.

Aristotle: Rhetoric: Book I: Ch 9

Consequently, whenever you want to praise any one, think what you would urge people to do; and when you want to urge the doing of anything, think what you would praise a man for having done.

I need to think about this, but it seems like a masterful approach to manipulation. Again, this needs consideration.

Praise is the expression in words of the eminence of a man's good qualities, and therefore we must display his actions as the product of such qualities. Encomium refers to what he has actually done; the mention of accessories, such as good birth and education, merely helps to make our story credible -- good fathers are likely to have good sons, and good training is likely to produce good character. Hence it is only when a man has already done something that we bestow encomiums upon him. Yet the actual deeds are evidence of the doer's character: even if a man has not actually done a given good thing, we shall bestow praise on him, if we are sure that he is the sort of man who would do it. To call any one blest is, it may be added, the same thing as to call him happy; but these are not the same thing as to bestow praise and encomium upon him; the two latter are a part of "calling happy," just as goodness is a part of happiness.

Reading this made me wonder what we have currently which is similar to or functions as an encomium. Does a positive 30 second news spot count as one? Do media representations of good deeds actually have the same cultural important that formal encomiums did in ancient Greece? I wonder just how important or lost the role of praise and honor have become in modern culture. Again, more to think about.